Supreme Council 18th century. Supreme Privy Council. The struggle for the revision of the "Conditions"

Supreme Privy Council- the highest advisory state institution of Russia in 1726-1730 (7-8 people). Created by Catherine I as an advisory body, in fact, it resolved the most important state issues.

The accession to the throne of Catherine I after the death of Peter I caused the need for an institution that could explain the state of affairs to the empress and direct the direction of the government, for which Catherine did not feel capable. Such an institution was the Supreme Privy Council.

The decree on the establishment of the Council was issued in February 1726. Field Marshal General His Serene Highness Prince Menshikov, General Admiral Count Apraksin, State Chancellor Count Golovkin, Count Tolstoy, Prince Dimitri Golitsyn and Baron Osterman were appointed its members. A month later, the son-in-law of the Empress, the Duke of Holstein, was included in the number of members of the Supreme Privy Council, on whose zeal, as the Empress officially declared, "we can fully rely." Thus, the Supreme Privy Council was originally composed almost exclusively of the chicks of Petrov's nest; but already under Catherine I, one of them, Count Tolstoy, was ousted by Menshikov; under Peter II, Menshikov himself found himself in exile; Count Apraksin died; the duke of Holstein had long ceased to be in the council; of the original members of the Council, three remained - Golitsyn, Golovkin and Osterman.

Under the influence of the Dolgoruky, the composition of the Council changed: the predominance in it passed into the hands of the princely families of Dolgoruky and Golitsyn.
The Council was subordinated to the Senate and collegiums. The Senate, which began to be called "High" (and not "Governing"), was at first belittled to such an extent that it was decided to send decrees to it not only from the Council, but even from the Holy Synod, which was formerly equal to it. The Senate was deprived of the title of governing, and then they thought of taking this title away from the Synod as well. First, the Senate was titled "highly trusted", and then simply "high".

Under Menshikov, the Soviet tried to consolidate government power; ministers, as the members of the Council were called, and senators swore allegiance to the empress or to the regulations of the Supreme Privy Council. It was forbidden to execute decrees that were not signed by the Empress and the Council.

According to the will of Catherine I, during the childhood of Peter II, the Council was given power equal to that of the sovereign; only in the question of the order of succession the Council could not make changes. But the last clause of the testament of Catherine I was left without attention by the leaders when Anna Ioannovna was elected to the throne.

In 1730, after the death of Peter II, half of the 8 members of the Council were Dolgoruky (princes Vasily Lukich, Ivan Alekseevich, Vasily Vladimirovich and Alexei Grigorievich), who were supported by the Golitsyn brothers (Dmitry and Mikhail Mikhailovich). Dmitry Golitsyn drafted a constitution.
However, most of the Russian nobility, as well as members of the Supreme Privy Council Osterman and Golovkin, opposed the Dolgoruky plans. Upon arrival in Moscow on February 15 (26), 1730, Anna Ioannovna received from the nobility, headed by Prince Cherkassky, in which they asked her "to accept autocracy such as your laudable ancestors had." Relying on the support of the guards, as well as the middle and petty nobility, Anna publicly tore up the text of the conditions and refused to comply with them; By the Manifesto of March 4 (15), 1730, the Supreme Privy Council was abolished.

The fate of its members was different: Mikhail Golitsyn was dismissed and died almost immediately, his brother and three of the four Dolgoruky were executed during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. Only Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgoruky survived the repressions, returned from exile under Elizaveta Petrovna and appointed head of the military collegium. Golovkin and Osterman during the reign of Anna Ioannovna occupied the most important government posts. Osterman in 1740-1741 briefly became the de facto ruler of the country, but after another palace coup, he was exiled to Berezov, where he died.

Emperor Peter II

The accession of Peter II was prepared by a new court intrigue, not without the participation of the guards. Catherine, with Menshikov and her other followers, of course, wanted to leave the throne after herself to one of her daughters; but, according to the general opinion, the only legitimate heir of Peter the Great was his grandson, Grand Duke Peter. Discord threatened between the supporters of the nephew and aunts, between the two families of Peter I from both of his wives - an eternal source of unrest in the state, where the royal court was like a serf manor. The cunning Osterman proposed a way to reconcile the sides that bristled at each other - to marry a 12-year-old nephew to a 17-year-old aunt Elizabeth, and to justify marriage in such a close relationship, he did not disdain such biblical considerations about the initial reproduction of the human race that even Catherine I bashfully covered this with her hand project. Foreign diplomats at the Russian court came up with a smarter world: Menshikov betrays his party, becomes his grandson and persuades the empress to appoint the Grand Duke as heir with the condition of marrying Menshikov’s daughter, a girl two years younger than Aunt Elizabeth.

In 1727, when Catherine fell dangerously ill shortly before her death, members of the highest government institutions gathered in the palace to resolve the issue of her successor: the Supreme Privy Council that arose under Catherine, the Senate, the Synod, and the presidents of the collegiums, but were invited to a meeting and the majors of the guards, as if the guards officers were a special state corporation, without whose participation it was impossible to resolve such an important issue. This supreme meeting decidedly preferred the grandson to both daughters of Peter. With difficulty, Catherine agreed to appoint this grandson as her successor. It was said that just a few days before her death, she resolutely announced to Menshikov her desire to transfer the throne to her daughter, Elizabeth, and reluctantly yielded to the opposite side only when she was made to look like they would not otherwise vouch for the opportunity for her to reign calmly.

Before her death, a will was hastily drawn up, signed by Elizabeth instead of her sick mother. This “testament” was supposed to reconcile the hostile parties, adherents of both families of Peter I. Four persons were called to the throne in turn: the Grand Duke-grandson, Tsesarevna Anna and Elizabeth and Grand Duchess Natalya (Peter II’s sister), each person with their offspring, with their "descendents"; each subsequent person inherits the predecessor in the event of his descendant death. In the history of the succession to the throne, this testament is a meaningless act. After Peter II, who even without him was considered the legitimate heir, the throne was replaced in such an order that the most far-sighted testament would not have been able to foresee. But this testament has its place in the history of Russian legislation on the succession to the throne, introducing into it, if not a new norm, then a new trend. Using the law of Peter I, it aimed to fill the void formed by this very law, made the first attempt to establish a permanent legal order of succession to the throne, to create a real basic law of the state: the testament itself defines itself as a basic law that has to remain in force forever, never subject to cancellation.

Therefore, the testament read in the solemn meeting of the royal family and the highest state institutions on May 7, 1727, the day after the death of Catherine I, can be recognized as the forerunner of the law on April 5, 1797 on the succession to the throne. For the history of Russian legislative thought, it would not be superfluous to note that the testament of Catherine I was compiled by the minister of the Duke of Holstein, Bassevich, who was then in St. Petersburg.

Supreme Privy Council.

Political reminiscences at home and foreign observations awakened in the ruling circles, if not the thought of public freedom, then at least thoughts of personal security. The accession of Catherine seemed a favorable moment in order to protect himself from arbitrariness, to strengthen his position in the management of reliable institutions. Proclaimed by the Senate not entirely legally, under pressure from the guards, Catherine sought support in people close to the throne at the moment of Peter's death. Here, most of all, they feared the strengthening of Menshikov's impudence, and from the very first days of the new reign there was talk of frequent gatherings of high-ranking nobility, the princes Golitsyn, Dolgoruky, Repnin, Trubetskoy, Count Apraksin; the purpose of these meetings is supposedly to achieve great influence in the board, so that the queen does not decide anything without the Senate.

The Senate itself, feeling like a government, hurried to stock up on reliable support and, immediately after the death of Peter, tried to appropriate the command of the guard. As early as January 1726, the observant French ambassador Campredon reported to his court that most of the nobles in Russia were striving to moderate the despotic power of the empress. And, without waiting for the Grand Duke Peter, the grandson of the reformer, to grow up and reign, people who expect to subsequently receive an influential share in the government will try to arrange it according to the English model. But Catherine's supporters were also thinking about self-defense measures: already in May 1725, there was a rumor about the intention to establish a close council at the tsarina's office from her intimate unborn friends with Menshikov at the head, which, standing above the Senate, would decide the most important matters. The Cabinet Council did show up, only with the wrong composition and character. During the life of Peter the Ladoga Canal was not dug up. At the end of 1725, Munnich, who was digging it, demanded 15,000 soldiers from the Senate to complete the job. A heated debate broke out in the Senate. Menshikov spoke out against Munnich's demand, finding such work harmful and unsuitable for soldiers. Others insisted on sending as the cheapest way to complete the useful work bequeathed by Peter the Great. When the opposing senators had talked enough, Menshikov stood up and ended the dispute with an unexpected statement that no matter how the Senate decided, but by the will of the empress, not a single soldier would be sent to the canal this year. The senators were offended and murmured, indignant, why the prince forced them to argue for no reason for so long, instead of forestalling the debate with this statement at the very beginning of the matter, and why he alone enjoys the privilege of knowing the will of the empress. Some threatened to stop going to the Senate. A rumor spread around the capital that disgruntled nobles were thinking of enthroning Grand Duke Peter, limiting his power. Tolstoy settled the quarrel with a deal with the dissatisfied, which resulted in the Supreme Privy Council, established by decree on February 8, 1726. This institution wanted to calm the offended feeling of the old nobility, removed from the supreme administration by unborn upstarts.

A. Charleman.Emperor Peter II in Petersburg

The Supreme Privy Council was composed of six members; five of them with the foreigner Osterman belonged to the new nobility (Menshikov, Tolstoy, Golovkin, Apraksin), but the sixth was adopted by the most prominent representative of the noble boyars - Prince D. M. Golitsyn. According to the decree of February 8, the Supreme Privy Council is not a completely new institution: it was made up of real privy councilors who, as "first ministers", in their position already had frequent secret councils on the most important state affairs, consisting of senators, and three, Menshikov , Apraksin and Golovkin, and also the presidents of the main boards: Military, Naval and Foreign. Eliminating the inconvenience of such "busy work", the decree turned their frequent meetings into a permanent office with exemption from senatorial duties.

The members of the Council submitted an "opinion" to the Empress in several points, which was approved as the regulations of the new institution. The Senate and collegiums were placed under the supervision of the Council, but remained with their old statutes; only matters of particular importance, not provided for in them or subject to the highest decision, that is, requiring new laws, they had to transfer their opinion to the Council. This means that the Senate retained administrative power within the limits of the current law, losing legislative power. The council operates under the chairmanship of the empress herself and is inseparable from the supreme power; it is not a "special collegium", but, as it were, an extension of the sole supreme power into a collegiate form. Further, the regulations decreed that no decrees should be issued before they were “absolutely taken place” in the Privy Council, were recorded and read to the Empress “for approbation”.

These two points are the main idea of the new institution; everything else is just technical details that develop it. In these paragraphs: 1) the supreme power renounced sole action in the manner of legislation, and this eliminated intrigues, approaches to it in secret ways, temporary work, favoritism in management; 2) a clear distinction was made between the law and a simple order on current affairs, between acts, the change of which deprived the administration of the nature of regularity. Now no important matter could be reported to the Empress apart from the Supreme Privy Council, no law could be promulgated without prior discussion and decision in the Supreme Privy Council.

To foreign ambassadors at the Russian court, this Council seemed to be the first step towards a change in the form of government. But it was not the form that changed, but the essence of government, the nature of the supreme power: while retaining its titles, it turned from a personal will into a state institution. However, in some acts the title of autocrat also disappears. Someone, however, was frightened, guessing what was going on, and the decree of the next, 1727, year, as if explaining the main idea of the institution, obscures it with reservations, minor details, even direct contradictions. Thus, ordering any legislative matter to be submitted to the Council in advance for discussion and promises not to accept “particular reports” on such cases from anyone, the decree casually stipulated: “Is it really from us that it will be commanded to do something particular and especially.”

This reservation destroyed the institution itself. But the initiative was made; the importance of the Supreme Privy Council seemed to be growing. The will of Catherine I introduced him to the regency under her young successor and gave him the full power of an autocratic sovereign. However, with all this power, the Council was completely powerless before the whims of the bad boy-emperor and the arbitrariness of his favorites. The need to regulate the supreme power, which had manifested itself under Catherine I, should now intensify in decent people from the tribal nobility, who expected so much from Peter II and were so insultingly deceived.

After the enthronement after the death of Peter I, his wife Catherine I, power was concentrated in the hands of Prince AD Menshikov. The latter tried in every possible way to reduce the role of the Senate, and on the other hand, he was forced to make an agreement with other "chicks of Petrov's nest."

By the decree of Catherine I of February 8, 1726, the Supreme Privy Council was established, which actually assumed the functions of the Senate, which, according to Peter I, exercised the supreme leadership of the country during his absence. The members of the Council formally had to give the Empress "secret advice on political and other important state affairs." The Senate, which was no longer called the Governing, but the High, as well as the colleges, were placed in a subordinate position to the Council, in which all the main levers of power in the empire were now concentrated. All decrees were sealed not only by the signature of the Empress, but also by the members of the Council.

Menshikov obtained from Catherine I that before her death she made a clause in her will that during the infancy of Peter II the Council received the same power as the reigning monarch (in fact, a collective regency was established), while the Council was forbidden to make any changes in the order of succession to the throne .

In the field of domestic policy, the activities of the Council were focused on solving, first of all, financial, economic and social problems related to the crisis in which Russia was in the last years of the reign of Peter I. The Council considered it a consequence of Peter's reforms, and therefore intended to correct them in a more traditional way for Russia (for example, the capital of the country was returned to Moscow). In current practice, the Council tried to streamline the system of accounting and control of public finances, as well as cut costs and find additional ways to replenish the state budget, including cutting spending on the army, reducing the officer corps, etc. At the same time, the row established by Peter was liquidated, the number of officials was reduced. At the same time, a number of restrictions on trade were lifted to attract foreign merchants, incl. revised protectionist customs tariff of 1724

Composition of the Council

The empress took over the chairmanship of the Council, and its members were appointed:

Field Marshal General His Serene Highness Prince Alexander Danilovich Menshikov,

Admiral General Count Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin,

State Chancellor Count Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin,

Active Privy Councilor Count Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy,

Acting Privy Councilor Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn

Vice-Chancellor Baron Andrey Ivanovich Osterman.

The composition of the Council changed: in March 1726, Duke Karl Friedrich of Holstein-Gottorp, married to the daughter of the Empress, Princess Anna Petrovna, was introduced into its composition.

The most serious changes in the composition of the Council occurred in connection with the death of Catherine I. Due to disagreements over her heir, Count Tolstoy was sentenced to death in May 1727 (with the replacement of exile), and after the accession to the presto of Peter II, the Duke of Holstein- Gottorpsky withdrew from participation in the Council.

In 1727, Princes Alexei Grigoryevich and Vasily Lukich Dolgorukov, who enjoyed the support of Peter II, Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn, Field Marshal and President of the Military Collegium, were introduced to the Council in 1727, and Field Marshal General Prince Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgorukov in 1828. Thanks to the intrigues of the Dolgorukovs and Osterman, Menshikov was sent into exile on September 7, 1727, and Peter II announced that from now on all instructions would come only from him. In November 1828 Count Apraksin died.

Enthronement of Anna Ioannovna

After the death in January 1730 of Emperor Peter II in Russia, where power was completely controlled by the "supreme leaders", a succession crisis arose. Seven members of the Council, as well as the favorite of Peter II, Prince Ivan Alekseevich Dolgorukov (son of a member of the Council Alexei Grigorievich), took part in deciding on the succession to the throne.

On 18 (29) January, meetings of the Council began to determine the heir. The candidacy of the eldest daughter of Tsar John Alekseevich Catherine, who was married to the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Her younger sister Anna Ioanovna, the Dowager Duchess of Courland, who did not have strong support at court, or even in Courland, became a compromise candidate. By 8 o'clock in the morning on January 19 (30), the decision was made, only Prince A.G. Dolgorukov opposed her election. Simultaneously with the proposal elected Duchess Anna, Prince D.M. Golitsyn suggested that her power be limited by a number of conditions written in the "Condition". In accordance with them, the empress, upon accession to the throne, had to undertake to maintain the Supreme Privy Council, which consisted of 8 people, and at the same time in the future without its consent: not to start a war; do not make peace; not introduce new taxes; not to promote to ranks (to the court, civil and military) older than the colonel, and to transfer the guards and the army under the control of the Council; do not favor estates and estates. In addition, the Council had to approve all sentences to deprive the nobles of life, property or dignity, and also received full control over state revenues and expenditures. Later, Prince D.M. Golitsyn wrote a draft constitution, according to which the rule of the highest aristocracy was established in Russia with the limited power of the monarch, which provided for the creation, incl. representative institutions. This plan, however, was not approved by the Council, without reaching an agreement, the “supervisors” decided to submit the issue for consideration by the nobility gathered in Moscow (the future Legislative Commission). Various groups came up with their own projects (all implied the restriction of the monarchy), but not a single one was supported by the Council.

Prince V.V. opposed the "Conditions". Dolgorukov, Baron A.I. Osterman and Count G.I. Golovkin. However, their opinion was not taken into account and Prince V.L. Dolgorukov with "Conditions" on January 20 (31) left for Mitava to the Duchess Anna. On January 28 (February 8), Anna Ioanovna signed the "Conditions", after which she left for Moscow.

She arrived in the capital on February 15 (26), where she took the oath of high officials and troops in the Assumption Cathedral. swore allegiance to the sovereign. The struggle between the factions entered a new stage: the “supreme” tried to achieve official confirmation (“Conditions” were only a preliminary document, “an agreement of intent”), and the group opposing them (A.I. Osterman, P.I. Yaguzhinsky and others) ), which enjoyed the support of the ordinary nobility, spoke in favor of a return to an autocratic monarchy.

On February 25 (March 7), a large group of nobles submitted a petition to Anna Ioannovna with a request to reconsider - together with the nobility - the future structure of the country. Anna Ioanovna signed the petition, after which, after a 4-hour meeting, the nobility filed a new one, in which they advocated the restoration of autocracy. The “Supreme” who did not expect such a turn of events were forced to agree, and Anna Ioannovna publicly tore up the “Conditions” and her letter in which she had previously agreed to their adoption.

Liquidation of the Council

By the Manifesto of March 4 (15), 1730, the Council was abolished, and the Senate was restored to its former rights. Representatives of the Dolgorukov family, as the most actively involved in the conspiracy, were arrested: I.A. and A.G. The Dolgorukovs were sent into exile, V.L. Dolgorukov - executed. The remaining members of the Council formally did not suffer, Prince V.V. Dolgorukov was arrested only in 1731, Prince D.M. Golitsyn - in 1736; Prince M.M. Golitsyn died in December 1730. G.I.

Golovkin and A.I. Osterman not only retained their posts, but began to enjoy the favor of the new empress.

Literature

Article posted by

Ganin Andrei Vladislavovich

Doctor of Historical Sciences

After the death of Peter I, the system of state administration he created was preserved with minor changes.

After the death of Peter I, the task was reaching a compromise between Peter's nominees and conservatives.

In 1726 the Supreme Privy Council was formed, which began to act according to the type of the Boyar Duma. It included: His Serene Highness Prince A. D. Menshikov, Admiral F. M. Apraksin, Chancellor G. I. Golovkin, Count P. A. Tolstoy, Prince D. M. Golitsyn, A. I. Osterman.

The Supreme Council ruled the country during the reign of Catherine I (1725-1727) and Peter II (1727-1730). Under the conditions of the reign of the minor Peter II, the Supreme Privy Council actually controlled the empire. Its functions:

Leadership of the Senate;

Approval of all decrees of the emperor.

In 1727, the composition of the Supreme Privy Council changed: the nominees of Peter I, Menshikov and Tolstoy, were sent into exile, having stained themselves with corruption and bloody searches. Instead, the Council included princes VL and AG Dolgorukie, representatives of the old boyar aristocracy. The main ideologist of the Supreme Council was Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn, a supporter of the executed Tsarevich Alexei, who spoke out against Peter's absolutism.

Activities of the Supreme Privy Council:

1) adopted laws to reduce taxes, weakened the police system introduced by Peter I, liquidated the Secret Chancellery - the main body of political investigation.

2) In 1727, the system of local government was reorganized: there was a reduction in the bureaucracy; the court and the collection of taxes were entrusted to the governors.

In the future, members of the Supreme Privy Council planned to reform the system of state administration and limit autocracy. After the sudden death of young Peter II in 1730, the Supreme Privy Council did not allow a vacuum of power and elected Anna, the niece of Peter I, Dowager Duchess of Courland, to the throne. . However, the nobility opposed the rise of the oligarchs and the creation of oligarchic rule in Russia. Under the leadership of the Prosecutor General P. Yaguzhinsky, the nobles appealed to Anna Ioannovna with a protest, and the Empress broke the conditions the next day after they were signed. Conditions were the first draft of the Russian constitution, and the constitutional monarchy in Russia in 1730 lasted one day.

Under Anna Ioannovna (1730-1740), the Privy Council was transformed into the Supreme Cabinet of Ministers and lost most of its powers.

In 1741, under Elizabeth Petrovna, the Supreme Cabinet was abolished.

The main opponent of the Privy Council was the nobility, who sought to obtain as many privileges as possible.

Stages of the rise of Moscow | The folding of the public administration system in the XIV-pp. 16th century | Zemsky Sobors: composition, mechanism of work, functions.

| Characteristics of the command system. | Local government at the end of the XVI century. | Features of public administration in p.p. 17th century | Legal foundations of the Russian state in the 17th century. | Changes in the administrative apparatus, public service and the organization of estates in Russia in the 17th century. | Prerequisites for the transformation of the system of power in the first quarter of the XVIII century. | Organization of public service and estates. |mybiblioteka.su - 2015-2018. (0.007 sec)

Supreme Privy Council- the highest advisory state institution of Russia in 1726-1730 (7-8 people).

Created by Catherine I as an advisory body, in fact, it resolved the most important state issues.

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The Supreme Privy Council - the highest advisory state institution of the Russian Empire in 1726-1730. consisting of 7-8 people. Created by Empress Catherine I as an advisory body, in fact, it resolved the most important state issues. Key positions in it were held by A.D. Menshikov.

In 1730, after the death of Peter II, half of the 8 members of the Council were the Dolgorukovs (princes Vasily Lukich, Ivan Alekseevich, Vasily Vladimirovich and Alexei Grigorievich), who were supported by the Golitsyn brothers (Dmitry and Mikhail Mikhailovich). Dmitry Golitsyn drafted a constitution.

However, part of the Russian nobility, as well as members of the Supreme Privy Council Osterman and Golovkin, opposed the plans of the Dolgorukovs.

Having rejected the married eldest daughter of Tsar Ivan Alekseevich, Catherine, 8 members of the Council elected his youngest daughter Anna Ioannovna to the kingdom by 8 o'clock in the morning on January 19 (30), who had lived in Courland for 19 years and had no favorites and parties in Russia, which means that arranged for everyone. Anna seemed to the nobles obedient and manageable, not prone to despotism.

Taking advantage of the situation, the leaders decided to limit the autocratic power, demanding that Anna sign certain conditions, the so-called "Conditions". According to the "Conditions", real power in Russia passed to the Supreme Privy Council, and the role of the monarch for the first time was reduced to representative functions.

On January 28 (February 8), 1730, Anna signed the “Conditions”, according to which, without the Supreme Privy Council, she could not declare war or make peace, introduce new taxes and taxes, spend the treasury at her own discretion, promote to ranks higher than a colonel, grant estates, to deprive a nobleman of his life and property without trial, to marry, to appoint an heir to the throne.

On February 15 (26), 1730, Anna Ioannovna solemnly entered Moscow, where the troops and the highest officials of the state swore allegiance to the empress in the Assumption Cathedral. In the new form of the oath, some of the old expressions that meant autocracy were excluded, but there were no expressions that would mean a new form of government, and, most importantly, there was no mention of the rights of the Supreme Privy Council and the conditions confirmed by the empress. The change consisted in the fact that they swore allegiance to the empress and the fatherland.

The struggle of the two parties in relation to the new state structure continued. The leaders sought to convince Anna to confirm their new powers. Supporters of autocracy (A.I. Osterman, Feofan Prokopovich, P.I.

Yaguzhinsky, A.D. Kantemir) and wide circles of the nobility wanted to revise the “Conditions” signed in Mitau. The ferment arose primarily from dissatisfaction with the strengthening of a narrow group of members of the Supreme Privy Council.

On February 25 (March 7), 1730, a large group of nobility (according to various sources, from 150 to 800), including many guard officers, appeared at the palace and submitted a petition to Anna Ioannovna. The petition expressed a request to the empress, together with the nobility, to reconsider a form of government that would be pleasing to all the people. Anna hesitated, but her sister Ekaterina Ioannovna decisively forced the Empress to sign the petition. Representatives of the nobility conferred for a short time and at 4 pm filed a new petition, in which they asked the empress to accept full autocracy, and to destroy the clauses of the “Conditions”.

When Anna asked the bewildered leaders for their approval of the new conditions, they only nodded their heads in agreement. As a contemporary notes: “It is their happiness that they did not move then; if they showed even the slightest disapproval of the verdict of the nobility, the guardsmen would have thrown them out the window.

Relying on the support of the guards, as well as the middle and small nobility, Anna publicly tore up the “Conditions” and her letter of acceptance.

On March 1 (12), 1730, the people for the second time swore an oath to Empress Anna Ioannovna on the terms of complete autocracy.

The idea of creating an institution that stood above the Senate was in the air even under Peter the Great. However, it was not implemented by him, but by his wife Catherine I. At the same time, the idea itself changed dramatically. Peter, as you know, ruled the country himself, delving into all the details of the government mechanism, both in domestic and foreign policy. Catherine, on the other hand, was deprived of the virtues that nature generously awarded her husband.

Contemporaries and historians differently assessed the modest abilities of the empress. Field Marshal of the Russian Army Burchard Christopher Munnich did not spare words of praise for Catherine: “This empress was loved and adored by the whole nation, thanks to her innate kindness, which manifested itself whenever she could take part in persons who fell into disgrace and deserved the disgrace of the emperor ... She was truly an intermediary between the sovereign and his subjects.

Munnich’s enthusiastic review was not shared by the historian of the second half of the 18th century, Prince M. M. Shcherbatov: “She was weak, luxurious in the whole space of this name, the nobles were ambitious and greedy, and from this it happened: practicing in everyday feasts and luxuries, she left all power government to the nobles, of whom Prince Menshikov soon took over.

The famous 19th-century historian S. M. Solovyov, who studied the time of Catherine I from unpublished sources, gave Catherine a somewhat different assessment: affairs, especially internal ones, and their details, nor the ability to initiate and direct.

Three dissimilar opinions indicate that their authors were guided by various criteria in assessing the empress: Minich - the presence of personal virtues; Shcherbatov - such moral qualities that should be inherent in the first place to a statesman, a monarch; Solovyov - the ability to manage the state, business qualities. But the virtues listed by Minich are clearly not enough to manage a vast empire, and the craving for luxury and feasts, as well as the lack of due attention to business and the inability to assess the situation and determine ways to overcome the difficulties that have arisen, generally deprive Catherine of the reputation of a statesman.

Having neither knowledge nor experience, Catherine, of course, was interested in creating an institution capable of helping her, especially since she was oppressed by dependence on Menshikov. The nobles were also interested in the existence of an institution capable of withstanding the onslaught of Menshikov and his unlimited influence on the empress, among whom the most active and influential was Count P. A. Tolstoy, who competed with the prince in the struggle for power.

The arrogance and dismissive attitude of Menshikov towards other nobles who sat in the Senate crossed all boundaries. An episode that took place in the Senate at the end of 1725 is indicative, when Minikh, who was in charge of the construction of the Ladoga Canal, asked the Senate to allocate 15,000 soldiers to complete the work. Munnich's request was supported by P. A. Tolstoy and F. M. Apraksin. Their arguments about the expediency of completing the enterprise begun by Peter the Great did not at all convince the prince, who declared in vehemence that it was not the job of soldiers to dig the earth. Menshikov defiantly left the Senate, thereby insulting the senators. However, Menshikov himself did not object to the establishment of the Privy Council, believing that he would easily tame his rivals and, hiding behind the Privy Council, would continue to rule the government.

The idea of creating a new institution was proposed by Tolstoy. The empress was to preside over the meetings of the Supreme Privy Council, and the members of the Council were given equal votes. Catherine immediately seized on this idea. If not with her mind, then with a heightened sense of self-preservation, she understood that Menshikov’s unbridled temper, his desire to command everything and everyone could cause strife and an explosion of discontent not only among the tribal nobility, but also among those who elevated her to the throne.

Campredon cites a statement by the empress relating to the time of the formation of the Supreme Privy Council. She declared "that she would show the whole world that she knew how to make people obey her and uphold the glory of her reign." The establishment of the Supreme Privy Council really allowed Catherine to strengthen her power, to force everyone to "obey herself", but under certain conditions: if she knew how to deftly weave intrigues, if she knew how to push opposing forces together with their foreheads and act as an intermediary between them, if she had a clear idea where and by what means should the highest government institution lead the country, if it finally knew how to create coalitions that would be useful to it at the right time, temporarily uniting rivals. Catherine did not possess any of the listed qualities, therefore her statement, if Campredon accurately reproduced it, hung in the air, turned out to be pure bravado. On the other hand, Catherine's consent to the creation of the Supreme Council indirectly testified to her recognition of her inability, like her husband, to rule the country. The paradox of the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council was that it combined the conflicting aspirations of those involved in its creation. Tolstoy, as mentioned above, saw in the Supreme Privy Council a means of taming Menshikov. These expectations were shared by Apraksin and Golovkin. Menshikov, in supporting the idea of creating a Supreme Privy Council, was apparently guided by three considerations. Firstly, he simply missed the steps taken by Tolstoy, and upon discovering them, he considered that it was useless to oppose them. Secondly, he also intended to benefit from the new institution - to crush five members of the Supreme Privy Council, he considered, easier than a large number in the Senate. And, finally, thirdly, Alexander Danilovich connected with the Supreme Council the realization of his long-standing dream - to deprive his worst enemy of the Senate Prosecutor General P.I. Yaguzhinsky of his former influence.

The Supreme Privy Council was created on February 8, 1726 by a personal decree of the Empress. However, rumors about the possibility of the emergence of a new institution penetrated the diplomatic environment as early as May 1725, when the Saxon envoy Lefort reported that they were talking about the establishment of a "Privy Council". Similar information was sent by the French envoy Campredon, who even named the names of the members of the future institution.

Although the legislator had sufficient time to draw up a fundamental normative act, the decree read by G. I. Golovkin to the members of the Supreme Privy Council on February 10 was superficial, giving the impression that it was written hastily. The creation of a new institution was justified by the fact that it was necessary to provide an opportunity for members of the Supreme Privy Council to concentrate their efforts on solving the most important matters, freeing them from petty concerns that burdened them as senators. However, the decree does not define the place of the new institution in the current government mechanism, nor clearly define the rights and obligations of the new institution. The decree named the names of the persons obliged to be present in it: Field Marshal Prince A. D. Menshikov, Admiral General Count F. M. Apraksin, Chancellor Count G. I. Golovkin, Count P. A. Tolstoy, Prince D. M. Golitsyn and Baron A. I. Osterman.

The composition of the Supreme Privy Council reflected the balance of power of the "parties" that competed in the elevation of Catherine to the throne: five of the six members of the Supreme Council belonged to the new nobility, and the tribal aristocracy was represented by one Golitsyn. It is noteworthy, however, that it did not include the favorite of Peter the Great, the person who was number one in the bureaucratic world, the Prosecutor General of the Senate P. I. Yaguzhinsky. Pavel Ivanovich was, as noted above, the worst enemy of Menshikov, and the latter did not object to the creation of the Supreme Privy Council, in particular, in the expectation that the position of Prosecutor General of the Senate would be eliminated and the Supreme Privy Council would perform an intermediary role between the Empress and the Senate.

Another ally of Peter, also an enemy of Menshikov, turned out to be overboard of the Supreme Privy Council - Cabinet Secretary A.V. Makarov. There was no place in it for such experienced businessmen as P. P. Shafirov, I. A. Musin-Pushkin and others. All this gives reason to believe that when recruiting the Supreme Privy Council, there was a bargaining between Ekaterina, Menshikov and Tolstoy.

On February 17, Cabinet Secretary Makarov announced in the Supreme Privy Council the decree of the Empress, which extremely puzzled and alerted Menshikov, - another person was appointed to the institution - Catherine's son-in-law, Duke Karl Friedrich Holstein. It was not difficult for the prince to unravel the purpose of the appointment - he assessed it as a desire to weaken his influence, create a counterbalance to him and a more reliable support for the throne than he, Menshikov. Menshikov did not believe that Catherine could dare to do such a thing without his knowledge, and asked Makarov again: did he correctly convey the command of the empress? Having received an affirmative answer, His Serene Highness immediately went to Catherine for an explanation. The content of the conversation and its tone remained unknown, but the result is known - Catherine insisted on her own. The Duke, at a regular meeting of the Supreme Privy Council, assured the listeners that he "will not be otherwise for a member and other ministers present for a colleague and comrade." In other words, the husband of the daughter of Empress Anna Petrovna did not claim a leading role in the Supreme Privy Council, which somewhat reassured Menshikov. As for the other members of the Privy Council, they were quite satisfied with the appearance of such an influential figure who, relying on kinship with the Empress, could resist the dominance of Alexander Danilovich.

So, the composition of the new institution was approved. As for his competence, it was determined by a vague phrase: “We have reasoned and ordered from now on at our court, both for external and internal state important affairs, to establish a Supreme Privy Council, at which we ourselves will be present.”

Subsequent decrees, issued both on behalf of the Supreme Privy Council and on behalf of the Empress, clarified the range of issues that were subject to its decision, and its relationship to the Senate, Synod, colleges and supreme power.

Already on February 10, the Supreme Privy Council ordered all central institutions to turn to him with reports. However, one exception was made: the three "first", in the terminology of the time of Peter the Great, colleges (Military, Admiralty and Foreign Affairs) were removed from the jurisdiction of the Senate, communicated with it, as equals, by promemoria and became subject only to the Supreme Privy Council.

There was a reason for this decree: Menshikov, Apraksin and Golovkin were the presidents of the three collegiums mentioned above; they also sat in the Supreme Privy Council, so it was not prestigious to subordinate these colleges to the Senate, which itself was dependent on the Privy Council.

An important milestone in the history of the Supreme Privy Council is the so-called "Opinion not in a decree on a new established Privy Council", submitted to the Empress by its members. There is no need to state the contents of all thirteen points of the Opinion. Let us dwell on the most important of them, which are of fundamental importance, since they more clearly than in the founding decree defined the purpose of creating a new institution and its main task. The Supreme Privy Council, said the Opinion, "serves only to relieve Her Majesty in the heavy burden of government." Thus, formally, the Supreme Privy Council was an advisory body, consisting of several persons, which made it possible to avoid hasty and erroneous decisions. However, the paragraph following this expanded the powers of the Supreme Privy Council by entrusting it with legislative functions: “No decrees should first be issued until they are completely taken place in the Privy Council, the protocols are not fixed and Her Majesty will not be read for the most merciful approbation, and then they can be fixed and sent by Acting State Councilor Stepanov (Secretary of the Council. - N.P.)”.

"Opinion" established the schedule of work of the Supreme Privy Council: on Wednesdays it should consider internal affairs, on Fridays - foreign ones; if there was a need, then emergency meetings were convened. "Opinion not in a decree" expressed the hope for active participation in the meetings of the Council of the Empress: "Since Her Majesty herself has the presidency in the Privy Council, and there is reason to hope that she will often be personally present."

Another milestone in the history of the Supreme Privy Council is associated with the decree of January 1, 1727. He, like the decree of February 17, 1726 on the inclusion of the Duke of Holstein in the Privy Council, dealt another blow to the omnipotence of Menshikov. In his statement to the members of the Council on February 23, 1726, the duke, as we remember, promised to be an ordinary, like everyone else present, member of the new institution, urging everyone to "each his opinion freely and frankly declared." Indeed, Menshikov retained the role of the first member and continued to impose his will on the rest. By decree of January 1, 1727, Catherine I decided to officially assign this role to the duke. “We,” the decree said, “we can completely rely on his faithful zeal for us and our interests, for this reason his royal highness, as our most gracious son-in-law and in his dignity, not only over other members of the primacy and in all incidents the first vote, but we also allow His Royal Highness to demand from all institutions the statements he needs.

Fortunately for Menshikov, the duke as a person was not able to resist him. Weak in body and soul, drunk even from a small amount of strong drinks, for which he had a tender love, the duke could not compete with the prince also because he did not know the Russian language, was not aware of the state of affairs in Russia and did not have sufficient administrative experience . The Saxon ambassador Lefort gave him a derogatory characterization: "The duke's way of life has robbed him of his good name"; according to the ambassador, the prince found “the only pleasure in a glass”, and he immediately fell asleep “under the influence of wine vapors, since Bassevich inspired him that this was the only way to make yourself fall in love in Russia.” Bassevich, the duke's first minister, an experienced intriguer and braggart, who believed that Russia owed him everything that happened in it, easily controlled the duke as a puppet and represented the main danger to Menshikov.

We find a similar judgment about the duke in the Danish ambassador Westfalen. True, Westphalen spoke less harshly about the son-in-law of the Empress, finding in him some positive qualities: “The Duke does not speak Russian. But he speaks Swedish, German, French and Latin. He is well-read, especially in the field of history, loves to study, writes a lot, prone to luxury, stubborn and proud. His marriage to Anna Petrovna is unhappy. The duke has not become attached to his wife and is prone to debauchery and drinking. He wants to be like Charles XII, between whom and the duke there is no resemblance. He loves to talk, and reveals hypocrisy.

Nevertheless, this, in general, an insignificant person had a significant impact on the empress. In turn, in addition to the advice of Bassevich, the duke, presumably, used the advice of his balanced and reasonable wife.

A description of Anna Petrovna's appearance and her spiritual qualities was given by Count Bassevich. As already mentioned, Bassevich did not spare colors in order to portray her in the most attractive way: “Anna Petrovna resembled her august parent in face and character, but nature and upbringing softened everything in her. Her stature, over five feet, was not too high, with her unusually developed forms and proportion in all parts of the body, reaching perfection.

Nothing can be more majestic than her posture and physiognomy; nothing is more correct than the description of her face, and at the same time her look and smile were graceful and gentle. She had black hair and eyebrows, a complexion of dazzling whiteness, and a flush that was fresh and delicate, such as no artificiality can ever achieve; her eyes were of an indefinite color and distinguished by an unusual brilliance. In a word, the strictest exactingness in nothing could reveal any defect in it.

All this was accompanied by a penetrating mind, genuine simplicity and good nature, generosity, indulgence, an excellent education and an excellent knowledge of the languages of the native, French, German, Italian and Swedish.

Campredon, who closely followed the balance of power at court, noted in his dispatches the growing influence of the Duke of Holstein on the empress already in the first half of 1725.

On March 3, he reported: "The queen, seeing in the duke the best support for herself, will warmly take his interests to her heart and will be largely guided by his advice." 10 March: "The influence of the duke is growing." April 7: "The Duke of Holstein is the closest attorney to the queen." April 14: “With envy and without fear, they look at the growing confidence in the Duke of Holstein, especially those who treated him with disdain and even contempt during the life of the king. Only their intrigues are useless. The queen, who wants to enthrone him on the throne of Sweden and hopes for him to receive military assistance from this power, sees in the duke her surest support. She is convinced that he can no longer have interests separate from her and her family, and that she can therefore only desire what is beneficial or honorable for her, as a result of which she, for her part, can fully rely on the conscientiousness of his advice and on the honesty of his relationship with her." April 24: “The Duke of Holstein, who during the time of the late tsar had no voice, now turns everyone around, since the tsarina is guided only by the advice of him and Prince Menshikov, our inveterate enemy.”

The duke counted on receiving from Peter as a dowry for the daughter of Livonia and Estonia, but did not receive either one or the other. But on May 6, 1725, Catherine presented the Duke of the islands of Ezel and Dago, which caused the hatred of Russian nobles.

The reader probably drew attention to the fact that the book is about the influence on the empress alternately of the Duke of Holstein, then Menshikov, then Tolstoy. At first sight, these judgments contradict one another. But, having looked closely at the personality of the empress, a weak-willed woman who strove to avoid conflicts with nobles and at the same time easily succumbed to the suggestions of one or the other, these contradictions must be recognized as seeming. Catherine used to agree with everyone, and this created the impression of the growing influence on her either of the duke and his wife and minister standing behind him, then of Menshikov, then of Tolstoy. The sources are silent about the influence of Makarov, but not because this influence did not exist, but because this influence was shadow. In fact, the palm in influencing the empress should be given to Menshikov, not only because he played a decisive role in raising her to the throne, but also because he had the power that, having easily given Catherine the crown, with the same ease could this crown take away from her. The empress was afraid of Menshikov, and even in a critical situation for the prince, when he tried to seize the duchy of Courland, she did not dare to remove him from power.

The expansion of the son-in-law's powers did not justify Catherine's hopes - with this maneuver, she ultimately failed to create a counterbalance to Menshikov in the Supreme Privy Council. The failure was explained primarily by the fact that the weak-willed, narrow-minded, deprived of the ability to make independent decisions, the duke was opposed by the energetic, assertive, experienced not only in intrigues, but also in knowledge of the situation in the country of Menshikov.

The natural shortcomings of the duke were aggravated by the fact that he easily succumbed to third-party influence. The man, without whose knowledge the duke did not dare to take a step, was his minister Count Bassevich - a person of an adventurous temperament, an intriguer by nature, who more than once put his master in an awkward position.

The goal that Catherine aspired to was simple - not only to keep the crown on her head until the end of her days, but also to put it on the head of one of her daughters. Acting in the interests of the duke, the empress relied on family ties and rejected the services and zeal of Menshikov, to whom she owed the throne. However, the duke turned out to be so weak that he could not cope with restoring order not only in the country, but also in his own family. Here is the testimony of the French diplomat Magnan, who noted, “by the way, the coldness and disagreement that reigns between him and the duchess, his wife, and reaching the point that he has not been allowed into her bedroom for more than three months.”

As we remember, Catherine promised to chair the meetings of the Supreme Privy Council. However, she did not fulfill her promise: in the fifteen months that had passed from the time of the establishment of the Supreme Privy Council to her death, she attended the meetings fifteen times. There are frequent cases when, on the eve of the day of the meeting of the Council, she expressed a desire to attend it, but on the day when it was to be held, she instructed to announce that she was postponing her presence to the next day, after noon.

The reasons why this happened, the sources do not name. But, knowing the Empress’s daily routine, one can safely express the opinion that she was unwell because she went to bed after seven in the morning and spent the night hours at a plentiful feast.

As already mentioned, under Catherine I, Menshikov ruled the Supreme Privy Council - a man, although of a faulty reputation, but with a fairly wide range of talents: he was a talented commander and a good administrator and, being the first governor of St. Petersburg, successfully supervised the development of the new capital.

The second person who influenced both the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council was secret cabinet secretary Alexei Vasilyevich Makarov. There is reason to get to know this person better.

Like Menshikov, Devier, Kurbatov and other lesser-known associates of Peter the Great, Makarov could not boast of his pedigree - he was the son of a clerk in the Vologda Voivodship Office. The amateur historian of the second half of the 18th century, I. I. Golikov, depicted the first meeting between Peter and Makarov as follows: glance at him, having penetrated into his abilities, took him to himself, appointed him as a scribe in his Cabinet and, little by little, elevating him, promoted him to the aforementioned dignity (of a secret cabinet-secretary. - N. P.), and since that time he has been inseparable from the monarch.

There are at least three inaccuracies in Golikov's report: there was no Cabinet of Peter the Great in 1693; Makarov served not in the Vologda, but in the Izhora office of Menshikov; finally, the starting date of his service in the Cabinet should be considered the year 1704, which is confirmed by a patent for the title of a secret cabinet-secretary.

Equally fantastic, but diametrically opposed information about Makarov's abilities was expressed by the German Gelbig, the author of the famous essay “Random People in Russia”. About Makarov, Gelbig wrote that he was “the son of a commoner, an intelligent fellow, but so ignorant that he could not even read and write. It seems that this ignorance made up his happiness. Peter took him as his secretary and instructed him to write off secret papers, a tedious job for Makarov, because he copied mechanically.

Even a superficial acquaintance with the documents of that time, to which Makarov was involved, is enough to be convinced of the absurdity of Gelbig's testimony: Makarov not only knew how to read and write, but also had an excellent command of the clerical language. It would be an exaggeration to consider Makarov's pen as brilliant, similar to that owned by I. T. Pososhkov, P. P. Shafirov, F. Saltykov, but he knew how to compose letters, decrees, extracts and other business papers, understood Peter's thoughts from a half-word and gave them an acceptable form for that time.

A huge mass of materials of national importance flocked to the Cabinet. All of them, before getting to the king, passed through the hands of the office secretary.

Among the government elite, Makarov enjoyed great prestige. Menshikov and Apraksin, Golovkin and Shafirov and other dignitaries solicited his benevolence. The archive fund of the Cabinet of Peter the Great contains thousands of letters addressed to Makarov. Taken together, they provide abundant material for the study of the characters, customs and human destinies of that time. Some turned to the tsar for mercy, others begged him from Makarov. It should be noted that petitioners bothered the tsar in rare cases: their hand was held by several decrees of Peter, who severely punished for filing petitions to him personally. Petitioners, however, learned to circumvent decrees: they turned with requests not to the tsar, but to Makarov, so that he would get the monarch to satisfy the request. The letters ended with a request to "represent" before the king and report to him the essence of the request "at a prosperous time" or "in due course." Prince Matvey Gagarin invented a slightly different formula: "Perhaps, dear sir, having seen the opportunity to inform his royal majesty." “At a prosperous time” or “over time” translated into modern language meant that the petitioner asked Makarov to report the request to the tsar at a time when he was in a good, benevolent mood, that is, Makarov had to catch the moment when the request could not cause outbursts of anger in an irritable king.

What kind of requests did not besiege Makarov! Marya Stroganova asked him to intercede with the tsar for the release of her nephew Afanasy Tatishchev from service, since there was “a need” for him in the house. Princess Arina Trubetskaya married her daughter and, in connection with this, urged Makarov to ask Catherine for permission to borrow 5-6 thousand rubles from the treasury, "to send us this wedding." Anna Sheremeteva, the widow of Field Marshal Boris Petrovich, asked to be protected "from petitioners in fugitive peasants, they are looking for great claims in their old years." The Countess asked the cabinet-secretary to report to the Tsar and Tsarina "at a favorable time" so that they "defend" her from the plaintiffs.

Many requests to Makarov came from the nobles. The President of the Admiralty Board and Senator Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin ended his message to the cabinet secretary with the words: “If you please, hand over the letter to His Tsar’s Majesty and how it will be accepted, perhaps, if you please, leave without news.” The son of the prince-pope of the most drunken cathedral, Konon Zotov, who voluntarily volunteered to go abroad for training, complained to Makarov from Paris: “... to this day I don’t have (from the king. - N.P.) neither praise nor anger.

Even the all-powerful Menshikov resorted to the mediation of Makarov. Not wanting to disturb the tsar with unimportant matters, he wrote: “About what, I didn’t want to bother your Majesty, I wrote at length to Secretary Makarov.” In a letter to Makarov, Alexander Danilovich, having outlined the essence of minor matters, informed him: “But I didn’t want to bother His Majesty with these small matters, what I would expect.” Menshikov, as well as other correspondents who were in a trusting relationship with Makarov, often informed the cabinet secretary of facts and events that he considered necessary to hide from the tsar, for he knew that they would arouse his anger. So, for example, in July 1716, Menshikov wrote to Makarov, who was abroad with the tsar: “So in Peterhof and in Strelina, there are a lot of sick people among the workers and they die incessantly, from which more than a thousand people died this summer. However, I am writing to you about this poor condition of the workers in your special knowledge, about which, unless some case calls, then you can convey, moreover, to tea, that even so many non-corrections here his royal majesty is not a little troublesome. In the report to the tsar, sent on the same day, there was not a single word about the mass death of the builders. True, the prince said that he found work on the island of Kotlin "in a weak state", but he called continuous rains the reason for this.

Makarov dared to help even those who were in royal disgrace. Among the nobles, favored by him, we meet the first "profit-maker" Alexei Kurbatov, who later became the Arkhangelsk vice-governor, Moscow vice-governor Vasily Ershov, the tsar's favorite orderly, and then Admiralty Alexander Kikin. The latter was accused in 1713 of criminal fraud with contracts for the supply of bread to St. Petersburg. The threat to end his life on the gallows seemed quite real, but the former favorite of the tsar was then rescued from trouble by Ekaterina Alekseevna and Makarov.

Makarov's activity as cabinet secretary deserves such detailed coverage, primarily because he also held this position under Catherine I. Moreover, the cabinet secretary in her reign acquired an immeasurably greater influence than in the previous one. Under the reformer tsar, who held in his hands all the threads of governing the country, Alexei Vasilyevich served as a speaker; under Catherine, who did not possess management skills, he acted as an adviser to the empress and an intermediary between her and the Supreme Privy Council. Makarov was prepared for this task, having more than twenty years of training in the craft of administrator under Peter's supervision. Knowing all the intricacies of the work of the government mechanism and able to tell the empress in time the need to publish the necessary decree, Makarov, along with Menshikov, became Catherine's main assistant.

Several facts testify to the high prestige Makarov managed to give to the institution he leads and to his own person as the cabinet secretary. So, by decree of September 7, 1726, important matters were ordered to be reported first to the Cabinet of Her Imperial Majesty, and then to the Supreme Privy Council. On December 9, 1726, Catherine, who highly appreciated Makarov's services, granted him the rank of Privy Councilor.

Another evidence of Makarov's high authority was the formula for registering his presence at meetings of the Supreme Privy Council. Even about senators, not to mention nobles of a lower rank, in journal entries we read: “admitted”, “admitted” or “summoned” to the presence of the Supreme Privy Council, while the appearance of Makarov was recorded by a more respectful formula: “Then came the secret cabinet-secretary Makarov”, “Then there was a secret cabinet-secretary Makarov”, “Then the secret secretary Makarov announced the Cabinet”.

The significance of the Senate and senators in the reign of Catherine significantly weakened. This is evidenced, for example, by the journal entry of the Supreme Privy Council dated March 28, 1726, when senators Devier and Saltykov arrived at its meeting with a report: “Before the admission of those senators, his royal highness (Duke of Holstein. - N.P.) deigned to announce his opinion: that when senators come to the Supreme Privy Council with deeds, they would not read those deeds and not discuss them in front of them, so that they would not know before the time that the Supreme Privy Council would discuss.

The foreign minister in the then bureaucratic pyramid also stood below Makarov: "At that meeting, Privy Councilor von Bassevich was admitted to His Royal Highness the Duke of Holstein." Recall that the Duke of Holstein was the son-in-law of the Empress.

Communication between the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council was carried out in various ways. The simplest was that Makarov informed the members of the council about the cancellation of the empress's intention to attend a meeting of the Supreme Privy Council.

Most often, Makarov performed an intermediary role between the Empress and the Supreme Privy Council, conveyed to him the oral orders of Catherine or carried out instructions from the Supreme Privy Council to transfer prepared decrees to the Empress for approval. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Alexei Vasilievich performed purely mechanical functions at the same time - in fact, during the reports, he gave advice to the Empress, who was ignorant in matters of administration and did not want to delve into the essence of the issue, with which she easily agreed. As a result, the orders of the empress actually belonged not to her, but to the cabinet-secretary, who knew how to tactfully impose his will on her. Let us give several examples, with the reservation that the sources did not preserve direct evidence that the Empress was a puppet in the hands of Menshikov and Makarov; This is where logical considerations come into play.

On March 13, 1726, the Supreme Privy Council learned that the Senate was not accepting promemoria from the first three colleges. This was reported to the Empress Makarov. Returning, he announced that the Senate from now on "will be written the High Senate, and not the Governing Senate, because this word" Governing "is obscene." It is unlikely that Catherine could have carried out such an action, which required appropriate legal training, on her own, without outside influence.

On August 8, 1726, Catherine, present at a meeting of the Supreme Privy Council, expressed a judgment that required her knowledge of diplomatic etiquette and awareness of precedents. She “deigned to have an argument” to send Prince Vasily Dolgoruky as an ambassador to Poland instead of Count Bassevich, “reasoning that it is possible for him there and without a public audience and other ceremonies to manage the embassy business, following the example of how here, being the Swedish ambassador Zederhelm repaired.

A special role fell to the lot of Makarov in the appointments. This is not surprising - after the death of Peter I, no one in the country could compete with Alexei Vasilyevich in knowing the shortcomings and merits of various nobles. Personal acquaintance with each of them allowed him to know their zeal for service, and the degree of disinterestedness, and such properties of nature as a tendency to cruelty or mercy. Makarov's recommendations were of decisive importance for the empress.

So, on February 23, 1727, the Supreme Privy Council presented a list of candidates for governors, Princes Yuri Trubetskoy, Alexei Cherkassky, Alexei Dolgoruky, and Alexei Pleshcheev, president of the Preimplementation Office. Catherine agreed to appoint only Major General Y. Trubetskoy as governor; “About the others,” Makarov informed the Supreme Privy Council, “I deigned to say that they are needed here, and in order to“ choose others and present them ”. In order to “deign to say” something like that, it was necessary to have detailed information about each of the candidates and be sure “that they are needed here,” and this was hardly possible for the Empress.

Makarov also stood behind Catherine's back when Major General Vasily Zotov was appointed governor in Kazan. The Supreme Privy Council considered it more expedient to appoint him President of the College of Justice, but the Empress. of course, at the suggestion of Makarov, she insisted on her own.

It is known that Alexei Bibikov, who had a brigadier rank, was patronized by Menshikov. It was him that Alexander Danilovich read for the Novgorod vice-governors, believing that Kholopov, recommended by the Empress, "because of old age and decrepitude, is not capable of any service." Ekaterina (read, Makarov) rejected Bibikov's candidacy, ordering "to elect another, older than him, Bibikov, as vice-governor."

Feedback from the Supreme Privy Council with the Empress was also carried out through Makarov. In the papers, one can find different versions of the wording, the meaning of which was that the Supreme Privy Council instructed Makarov to convey to the Empress the decrees he had adopted for their approval or for their signing.

Sometimes - though not often - Makarov's name was mentioned on a par with the members of the Supreme Privy Council present at its meetings. So, on May 16, 1726, “in the presence of four persons (Apraksin, Golovkin, Tolstoy and Golitsyn. - N.P.)… and secret cabinet-secretary Alexei Makarov, Alexei Bestuzhev's secret report, No. 17, from Copenhagen was read. On March 20, 1727, Alexei Vasilievich even took the initiative to transfer the money remaining in the Rostov diocese after the indicated expenses to the treasury. The Supreme Privy Council agreed: "Commit on that proposal."

Of course, the ruling elite knew about Makarov's influence on the empress. Makarov also made mortal enemies, among whom the most sworn were A. I. Osterman and Vice-President of the Synod Feofan Prokopovich. They gave him a lot of trouble during the reign of Anna Ioannovna, when Makarov was under investigation for many years and was kept under house arrest until his death.

However, the empress did not need prompting in all cases. At the level of domestic issues, she made independent decisions, as happened, for example, with the decree of July 21, 1726 on the procedure for holding fisticuffs in the capital. Petersburg Police Chief Devier reported that there were crowded fisticuffs on Aptekarsky Island, during which “many, taking out their knives, chase other fighters, and others, putting cannonballs, stones, and flails into their gloves, beat without mercy with death blows, from which there are battles and not without mortal slaughter, which slaughter is not imputed as a sin, they also throw sand in the eyes. The Empress did not ban fistfights, but demanded an honest observance of their rules: “Who ... henceforth in such fistfights for entertainment will have a desire, and they will choose sots, fifties and tenths, register with the police office, and then monitor compliance with the rules of fisticuffs” .

Another person whose influence on state affairs was undoubted, although not very noticeable, was A. I. Osterman. For the time being, he was behind the scenes of events, and came to the fore later, after the fall of Menshikov. The Spanish ambassador de Liria reported on January 10, 1728: “... after the fall of Menshikov, all the affairs of this monarchy passed into his (Osterman. - N.P.) hands ... of a person known for his qualities and abilities. According to him, Osterman was "a businessman, behind whom everything is intrigues and schemers."

Most foreign observers are unanimous in their high assessment of Andrei Ivanovich's abilities. Here is how the Prussian ambassador Mardefeld spoke of him on July 6, 1727, when Osterman was still under the patronage of Menshikov: “Osterman’s loan stems not only from the power of the prince (Menshikov. - N. P.), but is based on the great abilities of the baron, his honesty, his disinterestedness and is supported by the boundless love for him of the young emperor (Peter II. - N. P.), who has enough foresight to recognize in him the mentioned qualities and understand that the baron is quite necessary for this state for its relations with foreign powers.

It is not possible to agree with all the above assessments. Mardefeld rightly noted the rare quality of the nobleman of that time - Osterman was not convicted of either bribery or embezzlement. The statement about his mind, efficiency and role in the government is also true. Indeed, Osterman had enough physical strength and talents to not only familiarize himself with the content of the numerous reports received by the Supreme Privy Council from the collegiums, governors, officials who carried out his special assignments, but also to single out the most important of them in order to form the agenda of the next meeting, to prepare the corresponding decree, for which, on his instructions, assistants sought out previous decrees on a similar occasion. The domestic nobles of that time were not accustomed to such systematic work, and the industrious Osterman was indeed indispensable. According to Mardefeld, Osterman “carries the burden that they (Russian nobles. - N. P.), due to their natural laziness, they do not want to wear it.

Osterman's indispensability in resolving issues of everyday, routine life of the state was also noted by the observant French diplomat Magnan, who informed the court of Versailles in June 1728: “Osterman's loan is supported only by its necessity for Russians, no Russian feels hardworking enough to take on this burden.” Manyan is wrong in extending the lack of industriousness to all "Russians". Suffice it to refer to Makarov's office secretary, who was in no way inferior to Osterman in diligence. However, Alexei Vasilyevich lacked knowledge of foreign languages and awareness of foreign policy affairs.

Such were the people in whose hands the real power was and who had to look for ways to overcome the crisis that struck Russia at the beginning of the second quarter of the 18th century.

All the time that the monarchy existed in Russia, there was a struggle between the desire of the royal person to single-handedly resolve all issues and the desire of the most noble and high-ranking representatives of the Russian elite to get real powers of state power into their own hands.

This struggle went on with varying success, leading either to bloody repressions against the nobility, or to conspiracies against the monarch.

But after the death of the emperor Peter the Great an attempt was made not only to limit the power of the monarch, but to turn him into a nominal figure, transferring all real powers to the government, consisting of the most influential representatives of the Russian nobility.

Peter the Great, at the end of his life, nurtured the idea of creating a state institution that would be superior to the Senate. According to the emperor's plan, such an institution was to exist in the form of a deliberative and executive body with his person to help in solving state issues.

Peter the Great did not have time to put his idea into practice, just as he did not have time to leave wills in order to resolve the issue of a successor. This provoked a political crisis, culminating in the decision to access the throne of Peter's wife under the name of Empress Catherine I.

Government under the empress

Catherine I, she Marta Samuilovna Skavronskaya, she is Ekaterina Alekseevna Mikhailova, did not have her husband's ability to govern. Moreover, the empress was not eager to take on the entire burden of public affairs.

Therefore, Peter's idea of creating a structure that would become a government under a monarch became relevant again. Now we were talking about a body endowed with real powers.

The new institution was called the Supreme Privy Council. The decree on its creation was signed on February 19, 1726. Its first composition included Field Marshal His Serene Highness Prince Alexander Danilovich Menshikov, Admiral General Count Fyodor Matveevich Apraksin, State Chancellor Count Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin, graph Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn, baron Andrey Ivanovich Osterman.

In fact, it was a team assembled by Peter the Great and continued to rule the Russian Empire without its creator.

A month later, the Duke was included among the members of the Supreme Privy Council. Carl Friedrich Holstein, husband Anna Petrovna, daughters of Peter I and Catherine I, father of the future emperor Peter III. Despite such a high honor, the duke could not have a real influence on Russian politics.

Line-up change

There was no unity within the Supreme Privy Council itself. Each struggled to strengthen his own influence, and his Serene Highness Prince Menshikov, who tried to become a man whose word would be decisive in the Russian Empire, advanced further than others.

Menshikov managed to get Peter Tolstoy, whom he considered one of the most dangerous competitors, to leave the Supreme Privy Council.

The triumph of the Most Serene Prince, however, was not long - Catherine I died in 1727, and Menshikov lost the struggle for influence on the young emperor Peter II. He fell into disgrace, lost power, and ended up in exile with his family.

According to the will of Empress Catherine I, due to infancy Peter II, the grandson of Peter the Great, the Supreme Privy Council was temporarily endowed with power equal to that of the sovereign, with the exception of the right to appoint an heir to the throne.

The composition of the Council changed seriously - apart from Tolstoy and Menshikov, the Duke of Holstein no longer appeared in it, and in 1728 Count Apraksin died.

Representatives of princely families were included in their places in the Supreme Privy Council Dolgorukov And Golitsyn who subordinated their own influence to Peter II.

Dynastic crisis

By 1730, the Supreme Privy Council included princes Vasily Lukich, Ivan Alekseevich, Vasily Vladimirovich And Alexei Grigorievich Dolgorukov, and Dmitriy And Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn. In addition to them, only two old members remained in the Council - Osterman and Golovkin.

The Dolgorukovs were preparing the wedding of Peter II with the princess Ekaterina Dolgorukova, which was to finally consolidate their dominant position in the empire.

However, in January 1730, the 14-year-old emperor fell ill with smallpox and died. The Dolgorukovs, in despair at the destruction of their plans, tried to forge the will of Peter II in favor of Ekaterina Dolgorukova, but this idea failed.

With the death of Peter II, the male line of the family was cut short Romanovs. A similar situation occurred with Rurikovich, plunged Russia into Troubles, the repetition of which no one wanted. Representatives of the Russian elite agreed that if a man from the Romanov family cannot be a monarch, then a woman should become one.

Among the candidates considered were the daughter of Peter I Elizaveta Petrovna, daughter John V Anna Ioannovna, and even the first wife of Peter the Great Evdokia Lopukhina released from prison by Peter II.

As a result, the Supreme Privy Council agreed on the candidacy of the daughter of the co-ruler and brother of Peter I, John V, Anna Ioannovna.

"Conditions" for Anna Ioannovna

At the age of 17, Anna Ioannovna was married to the Duke of Courland Friedrich Wilhelm. Three months later, Anna became a widow, returned to her homeland, but at the behest of Peter was again sent to Courland, where she lived in the not very prestigious status of a dowager duchess.

In Courland, Anna Ioannovna lived for 19 years in an environment that was more hostile than friendly, constrained by means. Due to the fact that she was removed from her homeland, she did not have any connections in Russia, which most of all suited the members of the Supreme Privy Council.

Prince Dmitry Golitsyn, taking into account the position of Anna Ioannovna, proposed to condition her accession to the throne with restrictions that would secure power not for her, but for the Supreme Privy Council. Most of the "supervisors" supported this idea.

Unknown artist. Portrait of Prince Dmitry Mikhailovich Golitsyn. Source: Public Domain

The conditions put forward by Anna Ioannovna were enshrined in the "Conditions" compiled by Dmitry Golitsyn. According to them, the empress could not independently declare war or conclude peace, introduce new taxes and taxes, spend the treasury at her own discretion, promote to the ranks above the colonel, grant estates, deprive the nobleman of life and property without trial, marry, appoint the heir to the throne.

Such restrictions actually deprived the monarch of autocratic power, transferring it to the Supreme Privy Council. The implementation of these plans could direct the development of Russian statehood along a completely different path.

All the secret becomes clear

The “Verkhovniks”, who sent the “Conditions” to Anna Ioannovna, reasoned simply - a woman constrained in means without a family and support would agree to anything for the sake of the empress's crown.

And so it happened - on February 8, 1730, Anna Ioannovna signed the "Conditions", and the next day went to Moscow, where members of the Supreme Privy Council were waiting for her.

Meanwhile, the "supervisors" did not agree on the "Conditions" with anyone, although they gave them to Anna Ioannovna as the demand of the whole people. Their calculation was that first the new empress would approve the conditions, and only then all the other Russians would be presented with a fait accompli.

However, it was not possible to conceal the “Conditions”. The news that the Dolgorukovs and the Golitsyns intended to seize state power aroused sharp discontent among other representatives of the nobility. In Moscow fermentation began.

Anna Ioannovna, after entering Russia, was carefully protected from communication in order not to give her additional information. However, to forbid her from meeting with the sisters, the Duchess of Mecklenburg Ekaterina Ioannovna and princess Praskovya Ioannovna, was impossible. They explained to Anna that the situation was developing in such a way that there was no point in yielding to the “supervisors” and limiting their own power.

On February 26, 1730, Anna Ioannovna arrived in Moscow, where the troops and the highest state officials swore allegiance to her. In the new form of the oath, some of the old expressions that meant autocracy were excluded, but there were no expressions that would mean a new form of government, and, most importantly, there was no mention of the rights of the Supreme Privy Council and the conditions confirmed by the Empress.

Anna Ioannovna and her retinue. Photo: www.globallookpress.com

The Empress Strikes Back

On March 6, opponents of the Supreme Privy Council filed a petition to the Empress demanding the liquidation of the Council, the restoration of autocracy, the abolition of the Conditions and the restoration of the power of the Senate.

Everything was decided on March 8, 1730. On this day, the petition was submitted to Anna Ioannovna in the presence of members of the Supreme Privy Council in the Lefortovo Palace. The Empress accepted the petition, and immediately invited the "supreme leaders" to dinner, thus isolating them from the opportunity to take any action.

The palace where the events took place was surrounded by the imperial guard, whose commanders advocated the preservation of autocratic power.

The final discussion of the question ended at four o'clock in the afternoon, when the State Councilor Maslov brought Anna Ioannovna "Conditions" and she publicly tore them up.

The new empress remained an autocratic ruler, and for the Supreme Privy Council and its members it was a disaster.

On March 12, 1730, a new oath to Anna Ioannovna took place, this time on the terms of autocracy, and three days later the Supreme Privy Council was abolished by the imperial manifesto.

Anna Ioannovna breaks "Conditions".

"Verkhovnikov's idea" and "Conditions"

Portrait of Anna Ioannovna on silk. 1732

Rejecting the married eldest daughter of Tsar John Alekseevich, Catherine, 8 members of the Council elected his youngest daughter Anna Ioannovna, who had lived in Courland for 19 years and had no favorites and parties in Russia, and therefore arranged everyone. Anna seemed to the nobles obedient and manageable, not prone to despotism.

Taking advantage of the situation, the leaders decided to limit the autocratic power, demanding that Anna sign certain conditions, the so-called " Conditions". According to " conditions"real power in Russia passed to the Supreme Privy Council, and the role of the monarch for the first time was reduced to representative functions.

Conditions

Relying on the support of the guards, as well as the middle and petty nobility, Anna publicly broke " Conditions and his letter of acceptance.

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Supreme Privy Council

Supreme Privy Council- the highest advisory state institution of Russia in 1726 30 (7 8 people). Created by Catherine I as an advisory body, in fact, it resolved the most important state issues. The accession to the throne of Catherine I after the death of Peter I caused ... ... Wikipedia

SUPREME PRIVATE COUNCIL- higher state establishment of Russia in 1726-1730 (7 8 people). Created by Catherine I as an advisory body; actually solved the most important state issues. He tried to limit the autocracy in his favor, but was dissolved by Empress Anna ... ... Law Dictionary

SUPREME PRIVATE COUNCIL Modern Encyclopedia

SUPREME PRIVATE COUNCIL Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

SUPREME PRIVATE COUNCIL- SUPREME PRIVATE COUNCIL, the highest state institution of Russia in 1726 30 (7 8 members). Created by decree of Empress Catherine I dated February 8, 1726. Formally, it was an advisory body, in fact, it decided the most important state issues. Tried ... ... Russian history

Supreme Privy Council- the highest advisory state institution of Russia in 1726 30 (7 8 people). Created by Catherine I as an advisory body, in fact, it resolved the most important state issues. He tried to limit the autocracy in his favor, but was dissolved ... ... Political science. Dictionary.

Supreme Privy Council- (English Supreme secret Council) in Russia in 1726 1730. the highest state institution, formed by the decree of Catherine I of February 8, 1726. Formally, V.t.s. had an advisory character, but actually decided all the most important state affairs. W.t.s. obeyed... ... Encyclopedia of Law

Supreme Privy Council- SUPREME PRIVATE COUNCIL, the highest advisory state institution of Russia in 1726 30 (7 8 people, A.D. Menshikov, F.M. Apraksin, P.A. Tolstoy, etc.). Created by Catherine I. In fact, it solved the most important state issues. Tried to restrict... Illustrated Encyclopedic Dictionary Buy for 365 rubles

Russian history. Part 4, Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev. Tatishchev Vasily Nikitich (1686 - 1750), Russian statesman, historian. He graduated from the Moscow Engineering and Artillery School. Participated in the Northern War of 1700-21, performed various ... Buy for 49.9 rubles eBook

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